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In this essay I discuss the role of Cassius’ philosophical beliefs in his decision to 
assassinate Caesar.  I analyse the situation of Cassius and discuss whether or not 
Epicureanism can justify the assassination, then I use these conclusions to establish 
the importance of Epicureanism in Cassius’ decision.  I take the relevant aspects of 
Epicurean philosophy (privacy, friendship, fear, stability and justice) separately and 
make a judgement as to what parts of Epicureanism encourage or discourage the 
assassination. I bring this together with a discussion of how each of these aspects 
contributes to the Epicurean goal of tranquillity and thus assess whether the 
assassination is the correct course of action for an Epicurean.  I conclude that, though 
some aspects of Epicureanism would encourage Cassius to murder Caesar, the 
assassination is still unjustifiable due to both the personal and political beliefs of 
Epicureanism.  I further conclude that Cassius held Epicureanism as a theoretical 
ideology, whilst holding his Republican beliefs as more practical in application.  
Overall this shows that Cassius political beliefs were more important than his 
philosophical allegiances in these decisions; this gives weight to Griffin’s theory that 
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On the Ides of March of 44 BC Julius Caesar was murdered on the steps of the 
Theatre of Pompey; stabbed to death by Cassius, Brutus and forty other senators.  
History has favoured explaining the assassination in terms of political and personal 
issues and it is often overlooked that the two leaders of the conspiracy were 
philosophers; Brutus was an Antiochean Platonist and Cassius was an Epicurean.  The 
importance of politics and personality in explaining this event is crucial but the 
prejudice of seeing Romans as political animals with only a passing interest in 
philosophy unbalances our view of the events.1  Modern views of the role of Cassius’ 
Epicureanism, and of the importance of Greek philosophy to Roman politics are 
mixed.  Momigliano says: 
 
There is a conspicuous date in the history of Roman Epicureanism: the date (46 
BC) at which Cassius turned Epicurean, not to enjoy the pleasures of the Garden, 
but to reach the conclusion that the tyrant had to be eliminated.2 
 
Momigliano placed Epicureanism strongly at the heart of Cassius’ decision, whilst 
arguing that his views and justifications were unorthodox and aimed at reaching 
higher ideals than traditional Epicureanism.  Conversely, Sedley said: 
 
I dare say that most courses of action can be justified given a little ingenuity, 
whatever the philosophical principles you start from.  Cassius’ role in the 
assassination is eloquent testimony to that.3 
 
Sedley insinuates that Cassius is clearly contravening Epicureanism whilst convincing 
himself otherwise.  Sedley also argues that Cassius is not in fact pursuing the 
Epicurean goal of tranquillity, but instead a kind of moral satisfaction, unknown to 
orthodox Epicureanism.4 Griffin argues, more conservatively that Epicureanism was 
not the basis for the assassination, but rather that Roman politicians, including 
Cassius, saw philosophy as theoretical, and thus useful in forming a framework within 
which to assess political ideology, but insufficient in providing a complete guide on 
                                                 
1 Sedley, The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius, pp 41-2 
2 Momigliano, Review of Farrington, B. Science and Politics in the Ancient World, pp 151 
3 Sedley, The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius, pp 53 
4 Sedley, The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius, pp 46-7 
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how to act.5  Plutarch shows us good evidence of this when he describes how Brutus 
used hypothetical debates about tyranny to ‘test the water’ with possible recruits to the 
conspiracy.6 
 
Cassius, like most aristocratic Romans, was educated in all the major philosophical 
schools.7  The date of his conversion to Epicureanism is debated, but usually put 
between 48 and 46 BC; the battle of Pharsalus may have triggered this conversion.8  
Despite Caesar’s clemency after the battle, Cassius and many other prominent 
Pompey supporters consigned themselves to the political wilderness, to which the 
Epicurean practice of a quiet life would have been very compatible.  Evidence of 
Cassius’ conversion to Epicureanism is shown in his correspondence with Cicero.9  
Whilst Cassius was away from Rome Caesar won the last battles of the civil war and 
then returned to Rome where he ruled as a tyrant; he was declared dictator for life and 
the Republic was disbanded in all but name.  After a few years Cassius returned to 
Rome, becoming Praetor in 44 BC.10  Around this time Cassius began to form the 
conspiracy against Caesar.  It is evident from the sources that Cassius was the driving 
force behind the conspiracy, Plutarch and Suetonius both say that it was Cassius who 
brought Brutus into the plot and attribute the most of the planning to him.11  He plays 
a central role in the events and the sources conclude that he was both single-minded 
about the assassination and absolutely confident that they were acting justly. 
 
Throughout this essay I will discuss the relevant aspects of Epicureanism alongside 
the historical context and make a judgement as to whether Cassius was justified in 
assassinating Caesar.  Before I go on I would like to note that I do not intend to apply 
any hindsight. Cassius could not have predicted the 2nd triumvirate or the principate 
which resulted from his actions.  Furthermore it would go against Epicurean 
philosophy to examine an action in this way, as Epicurus says: 
 
                                                 
5 Griffin, Philosophy, Politics and Politicians in  Rome, pp 36-7 
6 Sedley, The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius, pp 44 
7 Sedley, Epicureanism in the Roman Republic, pp 36 
8 Sedley, The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius, pp 41, Cassius had sided with Pompey, against Caesar, in 
the civil war. The defeat of Pompey here dealt a large to blow to the Republicans and many, including 
Cicero, Cassius and Brutus surrendered. 
9 Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 15.19 
10 Plutarch, Brutus, 7 
11 Plutarch, Brutus, 8, 10, Suetonius, Life of Caesar, 80 
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The misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in 
short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the 
aid of chance.12 
 
Cassius’ decision to assassinate Caesar was either a wise decision or it was not, 





In Against Colotes, Plutarch attacked the Epicureans saying: 
 
But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who 
withdraw themselves and their followers from all part in the government? … Are 
they not those who declare that reigning and being a king is mistaking the path 
and straying from the right way of felicity? And they write in express terms: “We 
are to treat how a man may best keep and preserve the end of Nature, and how he 
may from the very beginning avoid entering of his own free will and voluntarily 
upon offices of magistracy, and government over the people.”13 
 
Though Plutarch’s presentation is particularly biased, he does highlight the first major 
problem for Cassius, the de facto view that Epicureans should avoid public life and 
‘live unnoticed’.  Epicureans argued that engaging in politics, public life or generally 
attracting attention would be detrimental to living a tranquil life.  Needless to say, 
assassinating a tyrant attracts a great deal of attention and thus I shall examine this 
Epicurean doctrine to see if it forbids Cassius’ decision or allows for any special 
dispensation. 
 
1.1 Reasons for ‘Live Unnoticed’ 
 
The ‘live unnoticed’ doctrine is rooted in Epicurus’ analysis of the type of desires 
which Epicureans should pursue and the kind they should avoid.  Epicurus says: 
 
                                                 
12 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 135 (Inwood & Gerson) 
13 Plutarch, Against Colotes, 31 (Goodwin) 
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Of our desires some are natural and necessary, others are natural but not 
necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to groundless 
opinion. 
 
Those natural desires which entail no pain when unsatisfied, though pursued with 
an intense effort, are also due to groundless opinion; and it is not because of their 
own nature they are not got rid of but because of man's groundless opinions.14 
 
Epicurus wants to distinguish between the types of desires we should act upon and 
those we should resist.  Necessary desires are those which are needed for pleasure15 
and life, those which cause pain when not fulfilled, like food, water and shelter.  
Natural desires are ones which are innate and not created by cultural surroundings; 
food and water are both natural as well as necessary.  The second passage shows that 
a natural desire can be unnecessary if it entails no pain when it is unfulfilled. Sex, for 
example, is a natural desire but not a necessary one, because we can live without it 
despite the desire being innate and instinctual.  Unnatural and unnecessary desires are 
for things which man both does not need and has no natural desire for; wealth, fame 
and power are good examples.  These desires are created by groundless opinion; 
culture and upbringing create false ideas about the value of these goods and we come 
to desire them, despite their superficiality.16  
 
Epicurus distinguished between the different types of desires because he wanted to 
show why acting on some desires leads to tranquillity whilst others do not.  The 
natural and necessary desires lead to tranquillity because they lead us to the things we 
need to keep us from suffering unnecessary pain.  Acting upon unnatural desires, on 
the other hand, does not relieve us from any pain because being denied them would 
not cause any; furthermore the pursuit of these desires can lead us into unnecessary 
problems and worse allow us to become accustomed to fulfilling these desires, thus 
causing us pain when we cannot do so.  For example dining nightly on lobster, caviar 
                                                 
14 Epicurus, Key Doctrines, 29-30 (Inwood & Gerson) 
15 The Epicurean description of pleasure was very original. Epicurus believed pleasure had two facets: 
Kinetic pleasures, which were physical and immediate (eating food, sexual intercourse) and static 
pleasures, which are more psychological and permanent (contentment, knowing one has friends). 
Kinetic pleasures are necessary to gain static pleasures, for example the kinetic pleasure of enjoying a 
friend’s company leads to the static pleasure of knowing one has friends. See Mitsis (1988, pp 11-51). 
16 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, pp 103-5 
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and foie gras is unwise because becoming accustomed to unnecessary delicacies 
forces you to continue to supplement these expensive desires and cause disturbance 
through the threat that these rare foods might be denied you at some later point.17 By 
becoming accustomed to a simple and frugal diet, you can have the same pleasure 
from the fulfilment of your necessary desire to eat, without the fear of going without.  
Epicurus is reported to have said "Send me a little pot of cheese, that, when I like, I 
may dine sumptuously."18 Epicurus had become so accustomed to simple frugal 
dining that, to his palate, cheese was a delicacy, thus he could derive as much pleasure 
from cheese as a normal man would from lobster.  Adjusting one’s lifestyle so as to 
only pursue natural and necessary desires is the best course to tranquillity. 
 
However, having said this, it is important to note that Epicurus is not against 
obtaining or pursuing unnatural and unnecessary goods outright.  Epicurus says: 
 
Although pleasure is the greatest good, not every pleasure is worth choosing. We 
may instead avoid certain pleasures when, by doing so, we avoid greater pains. 
We may also choose to accept pain if, by doing so, it results in greater pleasure. 
So while every pleasure is naturally good, not every pleasure should be chosen. 
Likewise, every pain is naturally evil, but not every pain is to be avoided. Only 
upon considering all consequences should we decide.19 
 
Given this an Epicurean should not always pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and 
similarly not just fulfil the necessary and avoid the unnecessary.  Though wealth is 
unnecessary for pleasure, some wealth is needed to obtain the basic necessary goods 
needed for tranquillity.  Thus some unnecessary goods can have a secondary value in 
their relation to obtaining necessary goods.  A point of distinction would be that goods 
which are unnecessary and unnatural should never be pursued for themselves, but 
only to secure necessary goods.  This displays a type of hedonistic calculus, that the 
value of goods and the wisdom of decisions are decided by their utility in obtaining 
tranquillity.  This shows a pragmatic approach to obtaining happiness and shows also 
that there are exceptions where pursuing unnecessary goods is the wise decision. 
 
                                                 
17 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 130-1 
18 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 10.11 
19 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 129 (Inwood & Gerson) 
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It is natural to assume that public office, as well as the wealth and fame associated 
with it, are unnatural and unnecessary because they are not needed for pleasure and do 
not cause pain when absent.  Furthermore Epicurus says that politics and public life 
are prisons, which prevents us from pursuing tranquillity.20 This is easy to understand, 
as politics brings unnecessary burdens and pains without contributing to pleasure.  
Epicurus also says that any possible gains from public life are better gained from a 
quiet life, a life which will grant the purest security.21  Epicurus was likely motivated, 
in this doctrine, by the volatility of public life in Athens; the great successes and 
honour earned by politicians like Alcibiades and Themistokles inevitably led them to 
exile or death, and Socrates’ very public practise of philosophy resulted in his 
execution.  It follows that tranquillity would be impossible whilst living with these 
potential problems; any security gained from politics, though theoretically possible, 
would feel unstable and temporary.  Lucretius repeats this orthodoxy, saying: 
 
Avarice and blind lust for status, which drive wretched people to encroach 
beyond the boundaries of right and sometimes, as accomplices and abettors in 
crime, to strive night and day with prodigious effort to scale the summit of 
wealth.  These sores of life are nourished in no small degree by the dread of 
death. …  Some throw away their lives in an effort to gain statues and renown. 
 
He describes how a serene and untroubled life is incompatible with striving for wealth 
and fame because these pursuits lead to crime, envy and endless ambition.  Lucretius 
explains that the motivations to be involved in public life are founded on avarice and 
rooted in the fear of death; because politicians are motivated by a desired view of their 
post mortem legacy.22  Through this Lucretius unmasks political motivations as solely 
self-interested and founded on groundless opinion, defining them clearly as 
unnecessary and unnatural.  Lucretius is even more hard-line about the ‘live 
unnoticed’ doctrine than Epicurus, leaving no exceptions for political life being 
acceptable.23 This is likely a reflection of the volatile and often fatal nature of Roman 
politics. 
 
                                                 
20 Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 58 
21 Epicurus, Key Doctrines, 7 
22 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 3.59-86 (Smith) 
23 Roskam, Live Unnoticed, pp 90-5 
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The Epicureans also make a positive argument, expressing the value of an unnoticed 
life.  The crux of this argument is security, the security of continued basic needs and 
the security from pain and death.  The Epicureans argue that living unnoticed is much 
better than public life at attaining tranquillity, and thus show that politics is not a 
reliable secondary good for attaining this tranquillity. 24  Living a quiet life allows 
Epicureans to discreetly obtain all the natural goods they need, providing they 
habituates themselves to simplistic lifestyles.  Attracting little attention means that 
you will avoid lawsuits, making enemies and other conflicts with your neighbours. 
Conversely, politicians will make enemies and fear countless evils.  The simple life 
allows one to pursue beneficial activities, namely philosophy, which, according to 
Epicurus, is therapeutic to the soul.  All of this speaks to the Epicurean, saying that an 
unnoticed life will almost always be more tranquil than a public one. 
 
1.2 Exceptions to ‘Live Unnoticed’ 
 
As I have said, the value of any Epicurean doctrine or decision directly relates to 
whether or not it contributes to the subject’s tranquillity; given this we must see ‘live 
unnoticed’ as practical wisdom, which will yield results in most cases, rather than a 
rule, which must be strictly adhered to.25  Thus, living unnoticed has secondary value 
to Epicureans, meaning that an Epicurean would not live a private life for privacy’s 
sake, but simply because in most cases it is the best course of action to attain 
tranquillity.  If this is practical advice there must be exceptions to it.  Epicurus said: 
 
In order to obtain protection from other men, any means for attaining this end is 
a natural good. 
 
Some men want fame and status, thinking that they would thus make themselves 
secure against other men. If the life of such men really were secure, they have 
attained a natural good; if, however, it is insecure, they have not attained the end 
which by nature's own prompting they originally sought.26 
 
                                                 
24 Epicurus, Key Doctrines, 14 
25 Earle, Live Hidden, pp 97-8 
26 Epicurus, Key Doctrines, 6-7 (Inwood & Gerson) 
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These examples show that Epicurus believed that gaining security through power and 
public office was possible sometimes, if a little unlikely.  This reinforces the idea that 
their value is solely based on whether they do in fact bring security and that ‘living 
unnoticed’ is a practical piece of advice, not a rule.27 
 
There is also good evidence to show that the Epicureans understood some specific 
exceptions to the abstention from public life.  Seneca says that, conversely to the Stoic 
principle of engaging in politics except in volatile situations, the Epicureans abstain 
from politics except in a state of emergency.  Cicero and Plutarch also agree with this, 
saying that exceptional situations can justify an Epicurean entering political life.28  
Though this principle is not mentioned by any Epicureans, its appearance amongst 
these sources gives it credence; furthermore its compatibility with the hedonistic 
calculus makes it reasonable to accept this as a genuine Epicurean doctrine. 
 
An Epicurean community needs certain things to survive and prosper: the security of 
law and order, the freedom to practise philosophy, the stability to provide the 
necessities of life, such as food and water and the confidence that the state will 
maintain these things.  It is for these reasons that Epicureanism, despite its private 
nature, exists within societies; to gain the benefits of a secure and ordered state.29  
Given this, a state of emergency, for an Epicurean would be a situation where these 
basic needs are threatened or lost.  For example, if a Roman senator were to suggest 
that the practise of Epicureanism be banned, an Epicurean would have sufficient 
reason to enter public life and challenge him.  Such an example of a direct attack 
against Epicureanism is easy to adjudicate; we must decide whether things like civil 
strife, civil war and tyranny, which do not directly threaten Epicureanism, should 
count as emergency situation.  Modern writers have made many attempts at answering 
this, some argue for liberal readings, permitting Epicureans to enter politics in order to 
make life more favourable for other Epicureans, whilst others see it as more 
restrictive, only permitting defence from direct attacks against Epicureanism or the 
breakdown of justice.30  The key factor here though is common to all Epicurean moral 
                                                 
27 Roskam, Live Unnoticed, pp 37-9 
28 Cicero, Republic, 1.10-1, Plutarch, Against Colotes, 31, Seneca, On Leisure, 3.2 
29 Brown, Politics and Society, pp 196 
30 Fowler, Lucretius and Politics, pp 127-8, Griffin, Philosophy, Politics and Politicians in Rome, pp 
30 
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philosophy, any political activity must be justified as contributing to tranquillity; it 
appears to me that ‘a state of emergency’ may not require a precise definition, instead 
rational calculus of the costs and gains of political involvement are enough.  The idea 
of political emergencies shows that the abstention from political life is purely 
practical, there can and will be reasons to enter public life.  Rome in 44 BC was 
definitely an exceptional situation because of decades of civil strife, which had led to 
a tyrant, usurping the Republic.  In later chapters I will assess whether this was an 
appropriate political emergency, requiring political action from Epicureans. 
 
We can also point to specific examples of Epicurean philosophers who have made 
themselves publicly known. Epicurus himself wrote letters to several Athenian 
politicians and Kings, giving advice; through this he made many friends throughout 
the Greek world.31 Furthermore his practice of philosophy and the texts he wrote 
brought him great fame.  Despite his simplistic lifestyle, it would be wrong to 
describe Epicurus’ life as unnoticed, but we can show that his works and 
correspondence would have led to tranquillity and thus justify the exposure.  
Publishing and teaching philosophy was clearly a labour of love and any trouble he 
would have suffered because of it would have been easily offset by the pleasure of 
reaching people with his philosophy.  Similarly any exposure he would have suffered 
from corresponding with political figures would have been offset by the pleasures of 
friendship and helping others.  Diogenes of Oenoanda’s monumental inscription 
shows this same calculus; though it directly conflicted with the idea of living 
unnoticed, teaching Epicurean philosophy was apparently of great importance to him, 
as is shown in the opening of the inscription.32  These individuals show concrete 
examples of how the hedonistic calculus can favour disregarding ‘live unnoticed’ in 
the pursuit of tranquillity. 
 
 
1.3 Habituation and ‘Live Unnoticed’ 
 
The importance of moral development and habituation also contributes to the 
relativity of the ‘live unnoticed’ doctrine.  It is acknowledged by Epicureans that 
                                                 
31 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 10.4-5, Seneca Letters on Ethics, 22.5-6 
32 Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fr. 1-2 
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someone cannot simply read Epicurus’ works, accept their validity and immediately 
become an Epicurean sage.  The nature of Epicurus’ ethics is shedding one’s false 
opinions and unnecessary attachments gradually, through practising Epicurean 
philosophy in your everyday life.  Becoming an Epicurean sage is something which 
takes time; as such not every Epicurean is at the same stage of control over their 
desires.  As I have said earlier, Epicurus believed it was better to habituate yourself to 
a frugal diet rather than an extravagant one.  Within this is an implicit assumption, 
that someone who had habituated himself to an extravagant diet would not be able to 
give it up without suffering disturbance from the loss, otherwise extravagance would 
not be a problem because you would be able to effortlessly switch between an 
extravagant lifestyle and a frugal one.  Epicurus’ argument is precisely the opposite, 
that the habituation of fulfilling unnecessary desires creates reliance upon them.  If we 
were to imagine a man with an extravagant diet who spontaneously converts to 
Epicureanism, what would be his best course of action?  A clean switch to bread and 
water is too much to ask, as this would cause unnecessary disturbance.  Alternatively 
he could, over time, reduce his extravagance and slowly habituate himself to a frugal 
diet; this is the more accurate representation of Epicurean ethics. 
 
This is very important for Cassius because he was a member of an old Roman 
political family and he had been raised to take a place in Roman politics.  He had been 
involved in politics many years before his conversion to Epicureanism, beginning 
with his Quaestorship in 53 BC.  The pursuit of politics and an esteemed place in 
public life was something he had been taught from an early age, and by the time of his 
conversion he had already become deeply involved in it.  His dedication to the 
Republic, as shown by Plutarch, and his long and dedicated political service, which is 
shown in his letters to Cicero, are testimony to the importance of politics in his life.33  
Cassius is like a glutton of politics and the same lessons apply.  It would be unwise to 
completely break from public life because he had become so habituated to it. Though 
he should aim at an unnoticed life, Cassius would likely be unable to find tranquillity 
if he had not come to terms with leaving politics. 
 
A similar point is also made by Plutarch: 
                                                 
33 Plutarch, Brutus, 8-9, Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 15.14-5, Letters to Atticus, 7.21, 23-4 
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Even Epicurus believes that men who are eager for honour and glory should not 
lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfil their natures by engaging in 
politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural 
dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they 
do not obtain what they desire.34 
 
This passage shows that Epicurus believed that people who deeply desired to lead a 
political life should not deny themselves; this is likely meant for people like Cassius, 
who have been raised to pursue such a life and have engaged in it for most of their 
life.35  This may also distinguish Cassius from similar Roman Epicureans who lived 




This shows two relevant points, that concerning the ‘live unnoticed’ doctrine, 
Epicureanism makes exceptions both for individuals and circumstances.  Cassius is 
undoubtedly one of these exceptions and the civil strife of the period deserves to be 
considered as an exceptional circumstance.  However, though the Republic may have 
been in troubling times, which would justify Cassius being involved in politics, the 







Epicurus believed that friendship was of paramount importance in obtaining 
tranquillity.  Friends bring pleasure through companionship and security through 
material and psychological support, which is crucial to tranquillity.37  Having friends 
means you will have financial aid when you have money problems, help when you are 
                                                 
34 Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Mind, 465f-466a (Helmbold) This asks the question ‘can there unnatural, 
necessary pleasure, which Epicurus never mentioned?’  
35 Roskam, Live Unnoticed, pp 52-3 
36 Atticus, though a Roman Epicurean of the same period made a different choice in deciding to live 
unnoticed; as Atticus was an equite, not born into the political elite like Cassius, he likely would not 
have had the same forceful drive to join public life. 
37 Mitsis, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory, pp 98-9 
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sick and protection from your enemies.  Having these things when they are needed 
and knowing you will have them, should trouble befoul you, allows you to live 
peacefully in the knowledge that you will be able to endure any crisis.38  This is why 
Epicurus says: 
 
Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one's entire 
life, by far the greatest is friendship. 
 
The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, 
and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily 
achieved through friendship.39 
 
In obtaining tranquillity nothing is given the same precedence as friendship.  Epicurus 
even says ‘Friendship is worth choosing for its own sake;’40 which is especially 
confusing because Epicurus holds that pleasure and tranquillity should be the only 
things we should value for themselves.41  This means that all Epicureans should 
cultivate a network of friendships, governed by mutual aid, and maintain them, 
remaining absolutely loyal to those commitments.42  Cassius was friends with many 
members of the Roman political elite, notably, Cicero and Brutus.43  The impact of the 
action on his friends and how it would affect his relationship are important factors to 
be analysed.  Thus I shall examine the important friendships and judge how they 
would be affected. 
 
2.1 Cassius and Caesar 
 
Cassius and Caesar were friends publicly, Caesar having granted Cassius clemency 
after the battle of Pharsalus and having made him Praetor in 44 BC.44  This would 
have presented a thin illusion of friendship and would create a sense of betrayal after 
the assassination.  However, in truth there was no affection whatsoever between the 
                                                 
38 Rist, Epicurus on Friendship, pp 122 
39 Epicurus, Key Doctrines, 27-8 (Inwood & Gerson) 
40 Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 23 
41 This debate over whether Epicureans can truly value friends for their own sake is a long one, which I 
shall not get into.  See O’Keefe (2001), Mitsis (1988) 
42 O’Keefe, Epicureanism, pp 148 
43 Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 15.18, Plutarch, Brutus, 1.3 
44 Plutarch, Caesar, 57 
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two, Cassius was betraying no one and none of Cassius’ friends, knowing the truth of 
the matter, would have perceived this as a betrayal and thus the assassination would 
not serve to weaken any of his true friendships.  This public friendship is irrelevant to 
Epicureanism and I shall move on. 
 
2.2 Cassius and the Roman Elite 
 
Cassius undoubtedly had friends amongst the Roman political elite Cicero’s letters 
show that they were close friends and Plutarch says that Brutus was also a true friend 
to Cassius.45  There are doubtlessly many others within the Senate and the rest of 
Roman politics who would have counted him a close friend, particularly amongst 
Republicans who hated Caesar.  It is not hard to imagine a network of friends and 
allies, who had fought together against Caesar with Pompey and had taken solace with 
each other after his defeat, together mourning the death of the Republic.  I do not wish 
to speculate too much, but it is no great leap to suppose that most of Cassius’ close 
friends would have been Republicans, many of whom he likely would have recruited 
for the conspiracy. 
 
Firstly, amongst these Republicans, the murder of Caesar would have been considered 
almost unanimously as liberation and a great favour to them.  Caesar’s tyranny had 
denied Roman politicians the right to pursue proper political careers, true power was 
monopolised by Caesar and the only sure way to progress in politics was through 
Caesar’s patronage.46  The disenchantment of Cicero is shown in a letter to Cassius 
which ends ‘About politics I can write nothing, for I do not care to write what I 
feel.’47 The assassination thus gave back the opportunity for Cassius’ friends to follow 
their political ambitions; his friends were troubled and distraught over the autocracy 
of Caesar and, as a true Epicurean friend should, Cassius came to their aid. 
 
As well as helping out friends Cassius is helping out himself by aiding them.  The 
favour of assassinating Caesar would have so greatly endeared him to these men that 
he could guarantee their trust and loyalty.  Cicero, after the assassination, through his 
                                                 
45 Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 15.19 
46 Suetonius, Caesar, 41 
47 Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 15.16 
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letters shows an unwavering support for Brutus and Cassius; his attempt to have them 
pardoned for Caesar’s murder shows the strength of this loyalty.48  The action itself of 
assassinating Caesar would have created a great bond between the conspirators; 
Cassius would have felt his confidence in these men grow strongly as they freed the 
Republic together.  This strengthening of loyalty and confidence within friendships is 
very important to Epicureans.  Having friends one can count on to deliver help when 
needed, as I have said, is a priority in reaching tranquillity.  Amongst these men 
Cassius, having freed them of a tyrant, could undoubtedly count many loyal friends 
who would aid him in any crisis he might suffer.  The pleasure of helping friends and 
security gained from their debt to him, make the murder of Caesar seem like a wise 
choice for Cassius. 
 
However there is a tension here; though Cassius’ friends may want Caesar murdered, 
is it what they really need?  Epicurean friendship is about mutual aid, helping your 
friends when they need help, but Epicureanism might not necessarily consider 
Cassius’ friends as ‘needing help’.  Political freedom is not necessary for tranquillity, 
and if tranquillity is not threatened Cassius may not be required to come to the aid of 
his friends.  The question here is ‘should an Epicurean help a non-Epicurean pursue 
non-Epicurean goals?’  The problem with answering this is that Epicurean discussion 
on friendship is framed in the ideal Epicurean community, in which everyone is an 
Epicurean following their desires correctly.  We have very little to go on, when 
deciding whether an Epicurean should help a friend do something which would not 
benefit (and might harm) their tranquillity because it did not come up much for 
Epicurean philosophers.  The simpler answer would be to say no, it would be wrong 
to help a friend achieve a goal, which was not in their best interest and a better choice 
would be to dissuade them from such goal.49  Alternatively, we might argue that the 
goal of helping a friend is not to help them attain tranquillity but to gain security from 
their loyalty through helping them.  If so, then the nature of your help and what end it 
leads to is not important, what matters is whether it cultivates your relationship and 
strengthens loyalty and thus your security.  The first answer presumes a certain 
amount of altruism in Epicurean friendship, whilst the second plays more to the 
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Epicurean doctrine that the subject’s own tranquillity is the most important factor.  
This problem comes down to the debate mentioned earlier, whether Epicurean 
friendship is genuinely altruistic or not, and given the depth of the debate I shall not 
venture into it here but I will point out that the central importance held by the 
subject’s tranquillity in Epicurean ethics should give the second answer more weight. 
 
2.3 Brutus and Caesar 
 
Although Cassius and Caesar were not friends, historical evidence shows that Brutus 
and Caesar were very close for a long time.  Though Brutus joined Pompey during the 
civil war the two still remained friends.50  After the war Caesar is shown to continue 
this friendship, favouring Brutus with a position as Consul.51  Brutus in joining the 
conspiracy betrayed a life long friend, and though he was not an Epicurean, it is worth 
analysing the impact of this betrayal and what importance it holds for Cassius. 
 
Firstly, the betrayal of a friend is always the wrong decision in Epicureanism; it is one 
of few rules which Epicureans seem to believe cannot be broken under any 
circumstances. This is because trust would be impossible within a relationship without 
absolute loyalty and the betrayal of any friend would cripple all your friendships 
through revealing yourself to be an untrustworthy individual.52  Epicureans would 
also hold that betraying a friend would cause great psychological disturbance, making 
tranquillity difficult. Given this, if Cassius were in Brutus’ position, assassinating 
Caesar would be the wrong course of action because it would damage his friendships 
and cause disturbance.  However, Brutus is not an Epicurean and does not hold these 
same views about friendship and psychology.  We are thus faced with another 
dilemma; should Cassius be encouraging Brutus to do something which he believes to 
be harmful, and would not do himself.  The question again seems to come down to, to 
what extent Cassius is ‘other-regarding’ in his friendship with Brutus.  There are two 
key points here to discuss, to what extent Cassius feels the disturbances of his friend 
Brutus and how important is it that Brutus is not an Epicurean and holds to different 
values. 
                                                 
50 Caesar having asked his men to make sure Brutus was not killed in the battle of Pharsalus shows this. 
Plutarch, Brutus, 5.1 
51 Plutarch, Caesar, 62 
52 Rist, Epicurus on Friendship, pp 128 
 21
 
The consensus among Epicurean writers is that friends should be loved as much as 
oneself, but what they value in those friendships is debated.  Torquatus in Cicero’s On 
Ends lays out three views held by Epicureans:  The first view holds we do not value 
the pleasure of our friends as much as our own, but still take pleasure in their 
pleasures.  The second holds that initially friends are made solely for utility, but over 
time become valued for themselves and thus the subject will become attached to their 
pleasure and pain.  Third view holds that Epicurean friendship is a contract of mutual 
affection, to love each other as one loves oneself.53  Each of these views promotes an 
idea of ‘other-regarding’ which would imply that Cassius either literally feels his 
friends’ pains and pleasures or should at least act as if he does.  The first view, 
however, does hold that despite this ‘other-regarding’ the subject’s own tranquillity is 
more important.  It is difficult to discern which, if any, of these views was more 
orthodox and impossible to assign one of them to Cassius.  However, despite this, it 
seems that such a close friendship as the one between Brutus and Cassius would 
create a certain amount of transfer of pain and pleasure, whichever view of friendship 
he should take.  Though Cassius should not necessarily treat Brutus as if he were 
himself, he needs to take into account a certain amount of disturbance which would 
result from his friend betraying another friend.  This said, this disturbance of Brutus 
over the betrayal would be offset by the gains made by the murder of Caesar, which 
are discussed in 2.2. 
 
As I mentioned in 2.2, the fact that Brutus was not an Epicurean should be a factor in 
Cassius’ decision.  Brutus was neither aiming to attain tranquillity nor did necessarily 
hold that friends should never be betrayed.  Given this we have to decide whether the 
pleasure and pain felt by Cassius from his friendship with Brutus is decided by what 
Brutus believes or what Cassius believes.  If Brutus’ beliefs are more important, there 
is good argument for the assassination, because Brutus was hostile to tyranny and his 
philosophical views (Antiochean Platonism) were also intolerant of tyranny.54  Thus, 
if Cassius respects Brutus’ views in this sense he would not suffer disturbance through 
him from the betrayal of Caesar; furthermore, his support of Brutus’ anti-tyrannical 
views would have strengthened their friendship.  On the other hand it could be said 
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that, according to Epicureanism, it would not matter whether Brutus was an Epicurean 
or not, he would still suffer disturbance from the betrayal, simply because he is 
human.  This argument is strong, particularly as Epicureanism would have seen 
Brutus’ failure to recognise the pain of betrayal as ‘groundless opinion.’  We are left 
with an impasse: on the one hand, Cassius gains through strengthening his friendship 
with Brutus, but at the same time he suffers from Brutus’ personal disturbance. 
 
There is one final point I would like to make about Brutus and Caesar.  By exhorting 
Brutus to join the conspiracy, Cassius took part in orchestrating the one of the most 
powerful and enduring scenes of betrayal in human history, ‘et tu Brutei?’  This 
moment is a scar on the fraternity of friendship, for which Cassius is partly 
responsible.55  Though such a consequence has no definable place within Epicurean 
ethics, the short term result would be Roman politicians losing trust in their friends, 
knowing that such a man as Brutus could turn on an old friend over politics.  This is a 
problem because it weakens the possibility of having a network of trusting friends.  
Having a network of friends, which have confidence in each other, is the ideal for 




For Cassius’ decision, friendship presents complicated problems. His relationship 
with Cicero and the other senators would have encouraged him to assassinate Caesar, 
but Brutus’ connection with Caesar presents a strong reason not to go ahead.  Overall, 
Cassius would have a stronger network of friendships if he killed Caesar, but would 
have to accept a certain amount of disturbance through Brutus.  This said, even if 
Brutus suffered from the action, it would not damage his loyalty to Cassius.  Cassius 
is caught between the interests of the larger network of friends and the interests of 
Brutus.  As the aim of an Epicurean is to establish a strong loyal network of friends 
and that Epicureans accept that sometimes you have to suffer disturbance so that you 
will be more tranquil later, it seems that assassinating Caesar is the best course of 
action where friendship is concerned. 
 
                                                 




Thucydides named fear as the ‘truest cause’ of war, and this applies equally well to 
tyrannicide. The autocracy of Sulla led to a great number of executions, senators of 
Caesar’s time would no doubt have feared the same kind of violence.56  In 
conventional morality, fear of death would be considered adequate justification for 
pre-emptive action.  In the case of Caesar’s tyranny it appears quite acceptable for the 
average Roman to take action if he believed his life was in danger.  Antiquity even 
gives us good examples.  Harmodius and Aristogeiton were praised as heroes when 
they murdered the Athenian tyrant Hippias’ brother.57  The destruction of Carthage 
was justified as necessary in order to remove permanently the persistent threat.58  It 
might be easy for the average Roman to accept the murder of tyrant, in what could be 
described as self-defence.  However, Epicureans viewed fear and the correct ways of 
dealing with fear differently to the average Roman. 
 
According to Epicurus, tranquillity is obtained by freeing oneself from fear and 
distress. This permeates through most of Epicurean ethical philosophy, but at the 
personal level, Epicureans identified two key causes of fear: the fear of death and 
false opinions about gods.59  In this section I shall examine the Epicureans’ view of 
the death and whether Cassius’ conspiracy can be justified as an attempt to deal with 
fear.  I will focus on Cassius’ own position and leave any fears for the state of society 
for later chapters. 
 
3.1 Epicurus and the Fear of Death 
 
One of the most consistent statements in Epicurean philosophy is “death is nothing to 
us.”  Death is not something to be feared or resented, nor should death promote any 
unwise action in order to evade it.  To the Epicureans, death is inevitable and final but 
it is not an evil.60 
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Being strict atomists the Epicureans held that the soul is an atomic compound, which 
exists within the body.  It is corporeal, like all bodies in Epicurean physics, and reliant 
on both the constituent parts of its compounded nature and the existence of the body 
to maintain it.  Thus when the body dies and can no longer function, the soul 
dissipates; at death the soul compound breaks down into its constituent atoms leaving 
no trace of itself.  Furthermore, the soul relies on the body to obtain sensory data; 
without the sense organs the soul cannot experience the world in any way.61  Given 
this the Epicureans draw their conclusions: 
 
1. An evil which is not experienced is not an evil 
2. The soul-compound breaks down upon death, and all thought, 
consciousness and sensory experience cease 
3. Death cannot be experienced and thus is not an evil 
 
One must have life to know goods and evils; life and death cannot be present at the 
same time, and if we are not present for death, we cannot suffer from it.62  This is 
argument of disembodiment, that because death cannot be experienced we need not 
fear it, nor will we desire life when we are dead, for we will have no faculties with 
which to desire it.63  Epicureans also argue that pre-life, our non-existence which 
lasted aeons before our birth, is the state that we will be in once we have died; without 
a soul or sensory perception.  Thus the Epicureans argue that our non-existence 
caused no suffering in this state for the same reasons that death will cause no 
suffering; we have no soul or sensory perception, so we cannot experience pain or 
pleasure and thus ‘death is nothing to us.’64 
 
Death is not a bad thing and an Epicurean should not consider his own death as an evil 
when making his decisions.  Furthermore an Epicurean could not argue that his being 
dead should be an evil if it impacted negatively on his friends, because in the state of 
death he would have no perception of his friends’ condition.  Sometimes death can 
even be the correct choice, as Diogenes Laertius says “sometime he (the Epicurean 
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sage) will die for a friend.”65  This means sometimes that if an Epicurean were forced 
to choose between his own life and the life of a friend, failure to prevent the death of a 
friend may cause such disturbance that the nothingness of death would be 
preferable.66  Given this we would have to say that the fear of death should never be a 
factor in Epicurean decision making, as it is not an evil or a pain, it does not have an 
impact on the hedonistic calculus.  This means the threat of death in an ethical 
decision should not warrant consideration; for example, if someone compels an 
Epicurean to do something unjust with the threat of death, the Epicurean should 
refuse, knowing that he is not in fact threatened, because death is nothing to him.  
However this does not mean that Epicureans should be indifferent to death. If an 
Epicurean were in the path of speeding car he would step aside; death is nothing, but 
life is still worthwhile.67  Though an Epicurean should not fear death, he will take 
steps to prevent it.  The extent to which they will do so is unknown because this is not 
explored at length in the extant Epicurean works. 
 
Though they do not believe death is an evil, Epicureans do hold that the fear of death 
is a major cause of disturbance in peoples’ souls.  According to Epicureans, 
groundless opinions about death, both religious and philosophical, are one of the 
greatest causes of anxiety and thus it is crucial to remove these disturbances to attain 
tranquillity.68  For Epicureans the correct thing to do this is to understand death, 
through the arguments mentioned above, and thus remove one’s fear of death.  It 
would be incorrect to attempt to try to remove the fear of death by gaining power and 
security and removing threats to yourself because this would be an endless and 
inevitably futile effort.  Thus the only way to free oneself from the fear of death is to 
both understand and accept it. 
 
3.2 Fear of a Tyrant 
 
At face value a Roman politician should have good cause to fear death, living under 
Caesar’s tyranny. When Sulla was dictator of Rome he executed many Roman 
politicians; some were genuine enemies, some were politicians who were powerful 
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enough to pose a threat to him and a few were innocents who were just unlucky.  
Cassius and his friends knew their history and doubtlessly expected no less from their 
new tyrant; the Roman senators of the time would have anticipated a fresh wave of 
proscriptions, believing no one to be safe.  Cassius had more reason to fear execution 
than most; he had the misfortune of being both a past enemy of Caesar (from the civil 
war) and being powerful and influential enough to pose a threat to Caesar.  If Sulla or 
Octavian had been in Caesar’s place, Cassius would have undoubtedly been executed 
immediately after the civil war.  We also know from Plutarch that Caesar was well 
aware of Brutus and Cassius’ threat to him, for he says: 
 
Once, when he (Caesar) was told that Antony and Dolabella were plotting 
revolution, he said it was not the fat and long-haired fellows that troubled him, 
but those pale and lean ones; meaning Brutus and Cassius.69   
 
Given this we have good reason to say that Caesar being alive was a clear threat to 
Cassius’ life. 
 
However one might argue that the threat to Cassius’ life is overstated.  Despite 
Rome’s fears over the volatility and ruthlessness of tyrants, Caesar had refrained from 
mass proscriptions.  Caesar had offered clemency to all his enemies in the civil war, 
even ones as influential as Cicero and Brutus.  Arguably, if he had wanted Cassius, or 
any of the other Roman senators, dead, the apt time to execute them would have been 
immediately after the war while their apparent opposition was still fresh.  Caesar had 
also offered to important political positions to Cassius; it seems unlikely he would 
entrust magistracies to someone he considered an enemy and planned to execute.70  
Furthermore, Cassius says in a letter to Cicero that he would sooner have Caesar as a 
dictator rather Gnaeus Pompey, implying that Caesar showed restraint where others 
might not.71  This shows that there was most likely no direct threat to Cassius’ life 
from Caesar during the period.  It does not, however, show that Cassius should not 
fear execution at some later point, for as long Caesar ruled as a tyrant his life or death 
was dependent upon him.  Though Caesar might be benevolent now, at a later date, 
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Caesar might simply decide to get rid of Cassius.  It seems that Caesar is a threat, but 
not a direct threat at that time. 
 
Initially the obvious conclusion for Cassius should be that this fear of execution is 
irrelevant.  If death is nothing to Epicureans then the threat of execution should not be 
a factor in any of Cassius’ ethical decisions; for life is not made better by being 
longer, death is not an evil and even should the execution be painful, it would be 
short.  On the other hand, the anxiety caused by the lingering threat of execution 
would be a cause of disturbance, which must be dealt with.  However as I have shown 
earlier, trying to remove the external causes of fear is unwise for Epicureans and thus 
executing Caesar in order to remove the fear of what he might do is an unwise course 
of action.  The correct choice would be to focus on understanding death and coming 
to terms with it. 
 
However, although assassinating Caesar based on the fear of death would be the 
wrong choice for an Epicurean, doing it to remove the threat of death might not be.  
As I have said in 3.1, an Epicurean would step out of way of a moving car to avoid 
being killed, because life is not troubling and he chooses to live.  We can extend this 
further, if an Epicurean should step away from moving car, then surely he should also 
act in self defence, should someone try to kill him, despite death not being an evil.  
Given this we can say that if the assassination of Caesar is legitimate self defence, 
then Cassius could legitimately kill Caesar, and this would be the same as stepping 
out of the way of a moving car.  This argument has its problems though.  Firstly, 
Caesar is not a car inexorably moving towards Cassius, the threat is neither direct nor 
immediate; Cassius does not know that Caesar will execute him for certain, so it 
would be wrong to treat him as such.  Secondly, Roman politics is more complicated 
than a car on a road; it would be more apt to describe it as a countless number of 
interconnecting roads with thousands of cars speeding in different directions.  Cassius 
has no way of knowing that if he should remove the threat of Caesar he would not be 
creating more threats to his life; should he step out of the way of this car he may well 
be stepping into the path of another danger, such as legal prosecution, revenge from 
the Caesar’s supporters or political instability.  This comes back to what I have said 
earlier about trying to deal with the threats which cause fear; the causes of fear cannot 
be eradicated because there will always more after you have removed one, it would be 
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an endless and futile task.  Thus Cassius would be better served coming to terms with 
death itself rather than trying to remove Caesar’s threat. 
 
3.3 Fear of Compulsion 
 
Living under a tyrant has more troubles to deal with than the fear of execution; Caesar 
had power to compel action from other Romans, dictate their lifestyle and the choices 
of individuals.  This is an obvious threat to Cassius, particularly if he wants to pursue 
Epicurean ethics and an Epicurean lifestyle.  The Epicurean maxim, to engage in 
politics in emergency situations, has often been interpreted as meaning that an 
Epicurean should enter politics to defend the right to practice Epicureanism and the 
Epicurean community, so this threat of compulsion does seem relevant. 
 
However, the threat of compulsion is the same as the threat of execution.  For 
example, should Caesar decide to compel Cassius to cease being an Epicurean, he 
would need to enforce this with punishment, but the only punishment which would be 
final enough to prevent his practise would be execution.  Fines, imprisonment or exile 
would not prevent a true Epicurean from practising the principles of his philosophy, 
only execution would be a true threat.  All compulsion is rooted in this same threat of 
execution, and as I have shown earlier, the threat of death should not concern Cassius 
and thus the threat of compulsion should not be his concern either.  However, what I 
have said concerns the threat of compulsion to Cassius and not the threat to 
Epicureanism itself.  In later chapters I will examine the threat of Caesar to 




For Cassius, the fear of death, no matter how real and likely, should not be a factor in 
his decision to assassinate Caesar, nor should it be seen as an acceptable justification.  
What this has shown is that there is a more preferable option for Cassius to deal with 
the fear of Caesar, to understand death and understand that Caesar poses no true threat 
to him because death is not an evil.  Nonetheless Epicureanism did understand that 
fear was a complex psychological issue which could not be controlled and placated 
easily.  Inevitably Cassius’ would have suffered some disturbance from fear of Caesar 
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but his assassination would still be unwise because the fear of death would still be 
present in one form or another because of the danger of Roman political life and the 




One of the more common hypotheses for an exceptional situation, which would 
permit an Epicurean to involve himself in politics, would be to prevent political 
instability.72  Epicurean communities required a stable city or nation to exist within 
and should civil war or conflict threaten this, it would be rational for an Epicurean to 
involve himself in politics to prevent instability and restore harmony.  Lucretius 
shows the Epicurean’s desire for political stability when he says: 
 
So the kings were slain, the time-honoured majesty of thrones and proud sceptres 
tumbled down in the dust … Thus the situation sank to the lowest dregs of 
anarchy, with all seeking sovereignty and supremacy for themselves. 
 
This passage, describes the death of kings and ensuing chaos of anarchy, showing 
how undesirable political instability is for Epicureans.73  Epicurus’ founded his garden 
within Athens to gain the security of its walls and army and presumably Epicurus 
would have sanctioned his followers engaging in Athenian politics if the stability of 
the polis were endangered.  Because of this Epicureans were interested in which 
political system best promoted stability.  There is an implicit assumption within most 
Epicurean political thought that a benevolent monarchy is the best system to obtain 
stability because singular rulers are stronger and the monopoly of power allows 
Epicureans to remain absent from politics.74  However Epicureans do not place 
themselves starkly behind monarchy, many Roman Epicureans believed that the 
Republic was a superior system because it was an equitable social contract between 
citizens.75  Furthermore, Epicurus chose to found the garden within democratic 
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Athens, rather than a monarchy.  Though there is debate about the best type of 
political institution, it is agreed upon that tyranny is unstable and undesirable.76 
 
Stability is one of the most important factors for Cassius’ decision because the 
assassination is an attempt at political change, to replace Caesar’s tyranny with the 
traditional Republic.  In making this decision Cassius must, as an Epicurean, weigh 
the merits of both political systems and for Epicureans stability is one of the most 
important factors in deciding this.  Given this we must assess the state of the Republic 
and the nature of Caesar’s tyranny, assessing which, given the information at hand, 
would provide the safest, most stable community for Epicureanism to thrive in. 
 
4.1 Stability and the Republic 
 
The Republic was favourable for stability for several reasons; firstly, because it was 
the traditional political system in Rome.  The Republic had endured for centuries, 
dating back to the expulsion of the kings in 509 BC and it had survived in the same 
form (though many changes occurred) up to Cassius’ lifetime.77  The Republic was 
the status quo for Rome and this appeals to the conservative nature of Epicurean 
political views; it is fair to say that as the Republic had remained intact for almost 500 
years that it was a stable institution.  Furthermore as it has existed for so long, all of 
Rome’s institutions; be they religious, political or military were all adapted and 
evolved to suit the Republic.  It would be unwise to inflict a great change on the way 
Roman politics worked because it would disrupt all the vital institutions that had 
developed throughout its history.  This viewpoint essentially argues that ‘if it’s not 
broke, don’t fix it’ and this chimes very well with the implicit conservative tendencies 
within Epicurean politics as well as the pragmatism in Epicurean ethics.  It would also 
be unwise to promote change because removing the Republic would encourage further 
political change.  Whilst the Republic remained in force it had the historical weight to 
discourage political revolution, once it is gone no political system would have the 
same authority that the Republic could draw from its historical significance and any 
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number of challenges would be possible, making civil unrest and revolution more 
likely in the future. 
 
However, though the Republic had endured for such a long time it did not always 
produce stability.  Constant foreign warfare, though it enriched the elites, was very 
demanding of the average Roman citizen and on two occasions (Pyrrhus in the early 
3rd century BC and Hannibal in the late 3rd century BC) incited foreign invasions into 
Italy, causing widespread disruption and strife.  Political violence also became an 
issue after the assassinations of the Gracchi brothers, Tiberius in 133 BC and Gaius in 
122 BC.78  From the Gracchi’s deaths up until Cassius’ lifetime, Roman politics grew 
increasingly volatile; Sulla and Gaius Marius’s conflicts brought strife to Rome 
during the early 1st century BC, and Sulla’s victory led to tyranny and mass 
proscriptions.  This political disruption was endemic by Cassius lifetime; its continued 
presence for the last century was a clear sign that this was not a passing crisis but a 
deep institutional problem.  Though the political structure of the Republic may not be 
entirely to blame for this instability, the constant civil conflict was a clear sign that the 
Republic, in its current form, was inept at preventing it.  Given this the sole fact that 
the Republic was traditional and had survived for such a long time is not enough to 
justify its existence; some might even claim that the Republic’s failure to change was 
a factor in causing these problems. 
 
There is an argument made by Polybius, in which he claims that political systems are 
in constant revolution; political institutions degrade and over time power is dispersed.  
A state begins as monarchy which becomes tyranny, then power moves to a small 
elite aristocracy which becomes an oligarchy, then to democracy, then into a state of 
mob rule and then finally back into monarchy, when the cycle starts all over again.  
Polybius believed this was inevitable in simple constitutions because power is always 
monopolised by a certain group, whether it be a king, the elite or the masses.  Whilst 
one group held all the power they will inevitably become corrupt and degenerate 
through hereditary succession, which would lead to this constant revolution and 
perpetual instability.79  The Roman Republic was believed to have resisted this 
inexorable degradation and inevitable instability because it was a mixed and balanced 
                                                 
78 Appian, The Civil Wars, 1.16, 26 
79 Polybius, Histories, 6.4-8 
 32
political system. The consulship represented monarchical power, the senate 
represented aristocratic power and the popular assemblies represented democratic 
power; whilst all these institutions fulfilled their functions all sections of society had a 
role in the state and each one balanced the other two, preventing degradation.  Thus 
the Republic, through its mixed political system could foster social cohesion and 
harmony, whilst preventing political and the social instability which was inevitable in 
simple constitutions.  Though this is not an Epicurean argument it was a well 
established theory amongst Roman intellectuals, Cicero endorsed this view in the 
Republic and Cassius was no doubt aware of it as well.80  Roman history also 
demonstrates the Republic’s ability to adapt and bring disenfranchised groups into the 
system; on two occasions the plebeians seceded from Rome, once in 494 BC over 
political elitism and again in 287 BC over economic deprivation, and were able to 
come to terms with the patricians both times.  This shows how the Republic was an 
inclusive, socially cohesive system which promoted stability.81 
 
On the other hand, one might argue that though the Republic maintained social 
cohesion in the early and middle periods, there is good evidence to show that this 
cohesion, and thus the stability it brought, degraded in the later period.  Sulla’s 
autocratic dictatorship is a clear example of tyranny, which the other institutions were 
unable to counter.82  The social war from 91-88 BC shows that the exclusivity of the 
Republic was still a major issue, capable of causing severe unrest very close to 
Rome.83  Most damaging of all was the growing rift between rich and poor. The 
dramatic expansion of the empire caused an influx of wealth and slaves which 
benefited the wealthy at the expense of poor. This caused major civil unrest and the 
inevitable rise of populist politicians, which exploited the divide between rich and 
poor to gather power to themselves and unbalance the system.  The Republic was 
powerless to stop these deep social problems from becoming entrenched in Roman 
society; this destroyed the social cohesion of Rome and created political instability, 
which inevitably led to destructive civil wars.84 
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Overall the merits of the Republican system in creating stability appear either purely 
theoretical or grossly outdated.  Though there is good reason to believe 
philosophically that the Republic could promote stability, it is clear that during 
Cassius’ time it was unable to do so.  One might argue that it is unfair to presume that 
a contemporary Roman, such as Cassius, would be able to analyse correctly these 
deep social problems and the Republic’s role in promoting them, arguing that these 
issues are only clear through hindsight and wider view of the development of Rome 
over the Republican period.  However, though Cassius might not have been able to 
perceive the deep social trends, the outward symptoms, such as populist politicians 
and impoverished lower classes, would have been clear for anyone to see and it would 
have been obvious that the current political system was not promoting stability.  Had 
the conflict between Caesar and Pompey been the first civil conflict in Rome, Cassius 
may have been excused for interpreting this as a problem caused by the individuals 
involved rather than the system.  This however, was not the case, and the repeated 
civil conflicts throughout the 1st century BC show that the Republic itself was at fault. 
 
4.2 Stability and Caesar 
 
The first point to address is the Epicurean hostility to tyranny. Caesar was 
undoubtedly a tyrant of Rome so it is worth analysing why Epicureanism disliked 
tyranny and whether these arguments apply to Caesar.  Though there is no complete 
criticism of tyranny in the Epicurean corpus, there are several brief mentions of it: 
Diogenes Laertius said the Epicurean sage would not be a tyrant, Diogenes of 
Oenoanda’s inscription says ‘By making men tyrants you permit outrages’ and it is 
thought that Epicurus’ work, On Life, contained a critique of tyranny.85  Philodemus’ 
fragmentary work, On the Good King According to Homer, also contains a criticism 
of tyranny, saying that those who rule through the fear of their subjects are tyrannical 
and create instability.86  These mentions of tyranny indicate that most Epicurean 
philosophers believed that tyrannical regimes were unstable because they ruled 
harshly and used fear, which inevitably created instability and revolution.  It is likely 
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that Lucretius’ passage describing the death of kings and ensuing anarchy refers to 
this idea of tyranny causing unrest; the line ‘the people eagerly trample on what they 
once feared’ shows that he believed harsh leaders caused this type of revolution.87 
 
The Epicureans, as I have said, do support peaceful monarchies, so their criticisms of 
tyranny do not apply to all singular rulers.  Given this we must draw a distinction 
between monarchy and tyranny in order to judge whether Caesar would be an 
acceptable leader for an Epicurean.  Unfortunately, in most places where Epicureans 
mention monarchy and tyranny, they do not make any qualifications; given this and 
the Epicurean principle of writing plainly, it is best to assume that they held the 
traditional meanings of the two words.  Plato gives a full description in The Republic 
where he describes tyrants as leaders who arise through the popularity with the masses 
and rule without the constraint of law.88  He says tyrants are always corrupt, using 
their power unjustly to execute and exile people and seize property in a self-
destructive manner, eventually leading to their downfall.89  Tyranny appears to imply, 
lawlessness, illegitimate power, and the merciless and destructive use of that power.  
Philodemus shows that he recognises this description when he says: 
 
For a king: … to practise mildness, fairness, royal gentleness and harmony of 
disposition to the greatest extent possible, as leading to a stable monarchy and 
not to a despotic exercise of power by fear.  But Cambyses…90 
 
Unfortunately the text after ‘Cambyses’ is lost, but it is safe to assume that after a 
description of a benevolent monarch, Cambyses is to be described as acting contrary 
to this, as a despotic tyrannical figure.  We know from Herodotus that Cambyses was 
despotic and volatile leader, who inspired fear in this subjects; he was, however, the 
legitimate emperor of Persia.  It seems that Philodemus, and likely other Epicureans, 
are more concerned with the nature of the leader’s rule rather than their legitimacy.  
Thus an Epicurean, judging Caesar ability to create stability, should focus on whether 
his rule was fair, lawful and is built on the love of the people rather than whether or 
not he usurped power from more legitimate authorities. 
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As an individual Caesar was praised for his personal restraint, he was a thoughtful and 
measured character who acted rationally, without religious superstition.  Even Cato, 
one of his greatest enemies, said that his self-control, particularly concerning 
consumption of alcohol, was admirable.91  This restraint is also reflected in his 
clemency towards his enemies; following the civil war he pardoned everyone who 
laid down arms and later involved many politicians who had fought against him in the 
governing of Rome.  This showed that Caesar lacked the volatility, vindictiveness and 
merciless nature that is normally associated with tyranny.  Epicureans endorse these 
traits as those of a good monarch; Philodemus says that clemency is important for a 
king and it has been theorised that the central aim of On the Good King According to 
Homer is a plea for restraint and self-control in Roman politics.92  Thus Caesar’s 
personality seems very appropriate for an Epicurean monarch. 
 
Caesar was also very popular with the Roman the people.  From his victories in Gaul 
onwards he became the most popular politician in Rome and thus his tyranny was 
supported by the love of the people.  He nurtured and maintained this popularity 
through continued military success, donations of money and food to the Roman 
people and the funding of public entertainment.93  Furthermore, Caesar won the 
support of the Italians and many provincials by admitting them into the senate; though 
this was likely a political move to control the senate, it won him popularity with 
people who had previously been excluded from the Roman political system.94  This 
shows that despite being technically a tyrant, his rule was based on the support of 
wide section of Roman society; this wide support is a source of stability because, 
unlike during the Republic, rival politicians could not provoke the hostility required to 
cause instability.  It is also important that this support is genuine and not based on 
fear; Caesar’s benevolence to the Roman people meant they had no desire to depose 
him, drawing the state into anarchy as Lucretius describes.  The only major exception 
to this wide support is the aristocracy; though the elite were not controlled through 
threats and proscriptions they were mostly still hostile to his reign and only restrained 
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themselves out of fear or impotency.  As I have said in the last chapter there was no 
direct threat to the lives of individual members of Roman elite; many who remained 
hostile to the regime were allowed to retreat from public life and some were even 
allowed to continue their political careers.  This again shows that though Caesar may 
not be a legitimate king, he does veer more to the picture of an Epicurean benevolent 
monarch because, for the most part, he rules with the consent of the populace. 
 
Despite being an unlawful leader, Caesar shows himself to have the appropriate 
personality and style of leadership for a monarch that an Epicurean should approve of.  
Caesar’s tyranny also provides the traditional advantages of a single leader: the 
strength of singular leadership and the monopolisation of power.95  Overall, where 
stability is concerned, Caesar’s tyranny appears to be perfectly acceptable for an 
Epicurean and certainly not a state of emergency, whilst the Republic appears 
incapable of providing stability.  However one final, and rather speculative, problem 
worth considering would be that, though Caesar may be a stable ruler, the future is 
uncertain; would Caesar institutionalise the monarchy and if so could Cassius rely 
upon similarly restrained and well-loved leaders taking his place.  Such speculation is 
unsuitable for Cassius’ decision but it is important to note that the stability of any 




In comparison both systems appear to show their merits, but Epicureanism should 
favour Caesar’s tyranny for several reasons.  Caesar rules in the manner of a 
benevolent monarch rather than a tyrant and he achieved a measure of the stability.  
The Republic, on the other hand, though theoretically should produce stability, fails to 
achieve these results.  The Epicurean sense of Realpolitik would favour Caesar, 
simply because he is more capable of achieving results.  There is no room in 
Epicureanism for any ideological commitment to a certain form of government; 
though a sense of practical conservatism may favour the Republic, to promote it out of 
faith would be entirely un-Epicurean.  Lastly even if an Epicurean were to believe that 
the Republic was the more favourable system for promoting stability he would need to 
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accept that assassinating Caesar and changing the system would create immediate 
instability.  This more than anything should stay Cassius’ hand; the apparent stability 
of the moment should not count as ‘a state of emergency’ and if acting might create 
instability that would mean Cassius would require strong, conclusive justification to 




Although Epicureans are silent concerning most political issues, the topic of justice is 
discussed extensively. Epicurus says: 
 
For prudence is the source of all other virtues, teaching that it is impossible to 
live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably and justly.96 
 
For Epicureans, living virtuously and attaining tranquillity was directly linked, thus 
living a just life is necessary for Epicureans.  Epicurean justice is both a private and a 
public virtue and thus an Epicurean must act justly and look to promote justice in 
society.  Privately the absence of justice causes psychological disharmony through 
both the guilt of acting unjustly and the fear of punishment for committing unjust 
actions.97  Publicly the absence of justice creates a state of anarchy and chaos, in 
which people do not respect their mutual associations with each other.  Lucretius tells 
us that if early human civilisations had not created and honoured just agreements then 
the human race would have been entirely extinguished.98 
 
Justice is an important issue for Cassius because, in his decision, he should be taking 
into account both whether the decision to assassinate Caesar is just, personally 
speaking, and whether or not the tyranny or the Republic are just political institutions.  
A likely ‘state of emergency’ to justify Epicurean political action would be a 
breakdown of justice, as the loss of security would be so great that it would impair 
tranquillity.99  Given this it is important to analyse, once again, whether the tyranny 
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constitutes a breakdown in justice and whether it gives Cassius sufficient justification 
to take action. 
 
5.1 Epicurean Justice 
 
Epicureans believe in contractual justice, the grounding tenet being ‘a pledge of 
reciprocal usefulness, neither to harm nor be harmed.’100  Epicurus says that justice is 
a secondary property, which does not exist in its own right; it did not exist before 
civilisation and does not exist between beings unwilling or unable to make reciprocal 
contracts.101  Thus Epicurus appears to give a conventionalist account of justice, 
which seems to describe justice simply as contracts between human beings, based on 
mutual advantage.  However, Epicurus gives an independent qualification for justice, 
saying: 
 
Of actions believed to be just, that whose usefulness in circumstances of mutual 
associations is supported by the testimony [of experience] has the attribute of 
serving as just whether it is the same for everyone or not.  And if someone passes 
a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual 
associations, this no longer possess the nature of justice.102 
 
This means that there is a standard by which convention can be judged to be just or 
unjust, whether a convention is ‘useful in mutual association.’  This gives Epicurean 
justice a foundation in nature; as human beings naturally desire security, they 
naturally come to desire these contracts of mutual association.103  This does however 
create a tension: if there is an independent standard drawn from nature then what role, 
if any, does convention serve?104  A similar issue is found within David Hume’s 
description of justice; he also holds that justice has an independent standard (public 
utility) and yet it draws on convention.105  Hume believed that though convention 
does not decide whether something is just or unjust, a stable, dominant convention can 
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provide the conformity which is necessary to achieve justice.106  This same answer 
applies to Epicureanism; though the standard of justice may be the same for all, 
conformity to a convention helps realise the benefits of mutual cooperation.  Even a 
sage needs the coordination achieved by a stable convention to gain the security from 
knowing that a reciprocal community will be realised.107 
 
It is also important to make a distinction between two senses of Epicurean justice; 
ideal and practical.  Ideal Epicurean justice is voluntary cooperation within a 
community which fully recognises the value of these mutual contracts.  This is 
eloquently put by Diogenes of Oenoanda: 
 
So we shall not achieve wisdom universally, since not all are capable of 
it.  But if we assume it to be possible, then truly the life of the gods will 
pass to men.  For everything will be full of justice and mutual love, and 
there will come to be no need of fortifications or laws and all the things 
which we contrive on account of one another.108 
 
Here Diogenes speculates that if everyone were to understand the benefits, both to the 
individual and the community, of living justly, then law and punishment would be 
unnecessary, because people would accept just contracts voluntarily.109  Lucretius’ 
description of the first human communities is close to this situation because the 
members submit to contracts voluntarily; however the motivation for accepting them 
is the fear of living outside of society rather than a correct understanding of what is 
best for mutual association.110 
 
The ideal picture, as Diogenes himself admits, is unrealistic for contemporary politics 
and any foreseeable future.  The Epicureans also present a more practical sense of 
justice.  Epicureans accept that not all people either understand the value of just 
contracts or understand the nature of justice and thus laws must be put in place to 
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motivate them to be just.111  Lucretius presents law and the threat of punishment as a 
necessary evil; people’s irrational behaviour and ignorance of justice requires the 
threat of punishment to promote the outward effect of a just society.  Despite this 
rather pessimistic view of mankind Epicureans do not believe, as Hobbes does, that 
mankind is by its very nature cruel and self-interested; rather that humans innately 
desire the stability of justice but are ignorant of how to achieve it.112  This kind of law, 
which enforces mutual cooperation is not necessary to make Epicureans just, rather its 
purpose is to protect Epicureans from people who act unjustly.113  Arguably an ideal 
sense of justice is possible amongst a small Epicurean community, but legislation is 
necessary to maintain justice in larger societies.  Epicurean communities existed 
within and relied upon larger nations for security, thus we can say that an Epicurean 
community is reliant on a practical justice within the larger community to maintain 
that security.  Without law and order, security within society would be impossible, 
and thus an Epicurean should in his daily life promote justice through just action and, 
in extreme cases, he should take political action to prevent the breakdown of 
justice.114 
 
As Epicureanism is an egoist philosophy the benefits to the individual must be spelled 
out explicitly.  As I have mentioned, justice in society prevents, or at least 
discourages, one member of the society from harming another, thus creating security 
for the community, which leads to security for the individual.115  This justice is self-
fulfilling: by conforming to the just conventions of society you promote it by example 
and breed confidence in your neighbours that you will continue to honour these 
conventions.  This confidence motivates your neighbours to fulfil their contracts to 
you; as long as conventions are held by most members of a community, the 
community at large will still honour them.  Conversely, contravening just conventions 
breeds insecurity; if other people do not hold to conventions then there is far less 
motivation for you to do so yourself.  Furthermore, as just contracts are conceived to 
prevent people from harming each other, an Epicurean, who would have no desire to 
harm another, would lose nothing from obeying a just contract; whilst he would gain 
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the security in knowing that others would not harm him.116  Acting justly as an 
individual and promoting a practical sense of justice is highly beneficial for an 
Epicurean’s security and will aid him in attaining tranquillity. 
 
5.2 Justice, Tyranny and the Republic 
 
As I have said in earlier chapters, the assassination is an attempt at political change, to 
remove the tyranny and restore the Republic.  Thus promoting justice is an 
appropriate justification; if Caesar’s tyranny constituted a breakdown of practical 
justice, and conversely the Republic promoted a just society, this would provide 
sufficient justification for Caesar’s assassination.  Both systems must be examined to 
show, which system, by Epicureans standards, best promotes justice. 
 
Momigliano argues that Epicureans of the Republican period believed that the 
Republican system was an especially just system:  He begins by taking account of the 
known Epicureans during the civil war, noting whether they sided with Caesar or 
Pompey; he argues that though there were many prominent Epicurean supporters of 
Caesar, such as Calpurnius Piso, most sided against him.  He argues that this shows 
that Roman Epicureans had strong political feelings and those who sided with the 
Republic were of greater number and much more enthusiastic.  He then argues that the 
Epicurean idea of ‘Frank Speech’ which is discussed by Epicureans as a correct way 
to discuss philosophy should be taken as having connotations of ‘free speech.’  If this 
were so Epicureanism would be both compatible with the Republic and incompatible 
with tyranny.  He then argues that the Epicureans favoured a state founded on 
consent, which would appropriately fit the Epicurean sense of contractual justice.  The 
Republic, as opposed to the tyranny, shows this consent through its democratic 
process.  Finally Momigliano argues that Lucretius’ history of human development 
places the Republic in an esteemed, advanced position.  After the fall of kings, the 
people set up ‘laws and magistracies,’ this is a clear reference to the Republican form 
of government and Momigliano argues that this is an endorsement of the Republic and 
shows a belief that only this type of system can maintain law and order.117 
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There are problems with Momigliano’s argument.  Firstly, in his analysis of the 
known Epicureans and their political affiliations he neglects to mention that there is a 
much more arbitrary line of division between those who support or oppose Caesar: 
class.  In the civil war, most of Caesar’s supporters were equestrians and most of his 
opponents were aristocrats; most Roman Epicureans, barring a few exceptions, such 
as Calpurnius Piso, sided with their class.118  The apparent favouring of the 
Republican side of the conflict is likely caused by history’s bias to tell the story of 
aristocracy rather than genuine Epicurean support of the Republic.  Secondly there is 
no evidence that Epicurean ‘Parrhesia’ has any political connotations; it is described 
as an appropriate way to discuss philosophy and as being important in social relations.  
It is anachronistic to apply any sense of ‘freedom of speech’ to this concept.119  
Lastly, Momigliano’s analysis of Lucretius is misleading; though Lucretius does say 
that ‘laws and magistracies’ brought an end to civil violence, there is no implication 
that this is a superior system to monarchy.120  Though Lucretius history of human 
development discusses ‘advancement’, he shows earlier on that human development is 
not always a good thing.  When he compares the fears, which men had to deal with in 
pre-civilisation to the horrors of war and civil violence which occur in developed 
civilisations he adopts an appearance of neutrality over the two, as if fear and 
suffering will beset the human race at every stage of development unless 
Epicureanism is widely accepted by mankind.121  Furthermore Lucretius’ explanation 
of the fear of punishment, which came necessarily with this stage of human 
development, is a strong criticism of the Republic and similar systems.  Thus it would 
be misleading to argue that Lucretius is supporter of the Republic, when at best he 
seems only to accept it tacitly. 
 
However there is one part of Momigliano’s argument which shows good reason for 
Epicureans to support the Republic; the belief that the Republic is a superior system 
because it relies on consent.  As I have shown in 5.1 Epicurean justice is contractual 
and is reliant on citizens’ ability to make contracts with one another; thus the consent 
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of society is very important in those contracts being validated.  Though the Republic 
was run by representative magistracies and an aristocratic senate, laws were passed 
within the assembly of the people; this meant that for a law to be binding the Roman 
citizens would have to consent to it.  Furthermore the mixed constitution allowed for 
different sections of society to have appropriate voices in the running of the state; this 
made an inclusive political system, which appears appropriate for Epicurean justice.  
The Republic also had judiciary bodies which practised fair and equitable punishment, 
which, as Lucretius says, prevented people from taking disproportionate revenge for 
wrongdoings; this further contributes to the first principle of Epicurean justice, that 
one should make contracts, neither to harm nor be harmed.122  These principles show 
that the Republic, as a political system was compatible with Epicurean justice and 
Philodemus shows that some Epicureans endorsed this.  In On the Good King 
According to Homer, he approves of the debates between Greek leaders, 
acknowledging the importance of mutual consent in government.  This is a veiled 
reference to the strengths of Republican politics, praising the value of taking multiple 
views into account when making decisions.123 
 
However, though theoretically the Republic appears to promote Epicurean justice, it 
fails to do so in reality.  The consent of the people in the Republic was gradually 
reduced throughout the 2nd and 1st century BC.  The assassination of the Gracchi, both 
of whom passed laws with the consent of the people in opposition to the senate, is a 
defining point because it showed the political elite were willing to use violence to 
force their political views upon the people.  The increase of authority in the senate 
also unbalanced the system in favour of the aristocrats, further weakening the voices 
of the people and thus weakening the public consensus in the actions of the 
government.  Economic changes also disrupted the social harmony of the Republic; 
the influx of slaves into Rome during the 1st century caused increasing unemployment 
amongst the lower classes and the growing wealth of the elites allowed them to 
acquire land throughout Italy, further monopolising business and depriving the lower 
classes.124  Though the political structure remained intact and still theoretically 
inclusive, the social and economic situation changed to make its strengths 
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irrelevant.125  As I have mentioned in chapter 4, conflict between politicians was 
common and thus consent between the ruling classes was eroded.  Philodemus’ On 
the Good King According to Homer can be interpreted as a call for restraint and more 
equitable relationships between politicians; thus showing recognition of the failings of 
Roman politics in the 1st century BC.  This shows that though the Republic allowed 
for Epicurean justice in theory, it had failed to do so in practice. 
 
Caesar’s tyranny, on the other hand, did not allow for any consent.  After he gained 
the dictatorship in perpetuity full sovereignty passed to him; his control over the 
magistracies through patronage and appointment meant that all the Roman political 
institutions were under his control and there was no consent from anyone on how the 
state was managed.  This kind of focused power conflicts with ideal Epicurean justice 
because the contracts which govern society are in hands of one man and thus people 
would not be able to enter in to them voluntarily; practical justice, however, is still 
achievable.  As I have mentioned earlier, monarchy is an acceptable system for 
Epicureans because the most important thing is maintaining peace, law and order; 
though the Republic may have some ideological significance through consent, 
practical law and order still has more utility in attaining tranquillity.  Caesar was very 
successful at restoring law and order to Rome; by monopolising power he ended the 
constant political conflicts between Republican politicians.  The loyalty he had 
established in the plebeians and the military made it very difficult for rivals to gain 
enough support to challenge his dominance; because of this, after defeating his 
enemies, Caesar was able to maintain a lasting peace in Rome.  This all points to 
Caesar’s success at attaining practical Epicurean justice throughout Rome, something 
the Republic had failed to do in the past century. 
 
For Cassius to justify the assassination through justice, we have to be able to show 
that Caesar’s tyranny was a breakdown of justice.  Caesar broke the conventions of 
the Republic attaining his position, but whether that was just or not is not the issue for 
Cassius, rather his decision depends on whether the tyranny is a just system once it is 
in place.  As I have shown Caesar’s tyranny is perfectly compatible with practical 
justice and thus, according with Epicureanism, the standards of security are met.  
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Cassius, as an Epicurean, should not risk political action in order to achieve any 
ideological sense of justice that the Republic may possess, especially when this very 
action would risk causing an actual breakdown of justice through such a drastic 
political change. 
 
5.3 A Just Murder? 
 
A further point which Cassius has to contend with is that by going through the 
assassination of Caesar he would be breaking the first principle of Epicurean justice, 
‘not to harm or be harmed.’  In a regular situation murder is intolerable for an 
Epicurean because both guilt and the fear of punishment would cause great 
disturbance and detract from tranquillity.  For the assassination to be acceptable we 
must explain how the murder of Caesar could be an exception to this rule. 
 
Though murder in Rome was both illegal and unjust there is speculation that 
tyrannicide had some legal basis and at the very least had a strong cultural value, 
which could be considered a convention.126  This convention of tyrannicide gives the 
possibility of an exception to the ‘not to harm or be harmed’ rule in Epicurean justice; 
arguably this concept could be described as a regional irregularities in justice.127  Thus 
the peculiarities of Rome and its history of tyrannical rule could allow for tyrannicide 
to be a just murder by Epicurean standards.  However, the standard of justness to 
which all laws and conventions are held is whether it is ‘useful for mutual association’ 
and thus so must tyrannicide.  Given what I have shown in 5.2; that Caesar’s tyranny 
restored law and order, which is useful to mutual association, his murder would 
therefore be detrimental to it.  Furthermore, the open murder of an individual detracts 
from the convention that one should not harm another; the public weakening of the 
convention makes the possibility of further political murders more common and thus 
is even more detrimental to stability.  Epicurus said that, because the justness of a law 
is dependent on an independent standard, the justness of a law or convention will be 
contingent on the current circumstances; thus, tyrannicide may be acceptable when a 
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tyrant has a detrimental effect on mutual association but not in the case of Caesar.128  
In this case, tyrannicide is not a legitimate excuse to breach the founding principles of 




In conclusion, the assassination of Caesar cannot be justified as a private action or 
public action.  Though there may be some advantages to the Republic, Caesar’s 
tyranny is sufficient to provide practical justice to the state and thus provide the 
necessary security to Epicureans living within it.  The conservative and private 
inclinations of Epicureanism should prevail simply because Caesar’s tyranny does not 
create an emergency situation which would necessitate political action.  Any kind 
ideological argument would be incompatible with Epicureanism and thus Cassius has 
no justification to murder Caesar by Epicurean standards; furthermore Epicureanism 
as a whole would favour inaction in this case.  Momigliano’s sense of ‘Heroic 
Epicureanism’ attempts to redefine Epicureanism as more active in promoting the 
ideals of Epicureanism but as he lacks both source evidence and an explanation of 




Having considered all these factors, the final conclusion must come from a discussion 
of tranquillity; being the sole end goal of an Epicurean lifestyle it must be the final 
judge of on whether Cassius was right to assassinate Caesar.  I have shown in this 
paper that despite there being some reasons to believe that the assassination may aid 
tranquillity (ie. helping friends, freedom etc.), the importance of living unnoticed and 
political stability give far greater reason not to act.  Caesar’s tyranny, as it was at the 
time, was no threat to an Epicurean lifestyle and in no meaningful way was it 
detrimental to tranquillity.  Though there are some contentious arguments over 
whether the Republic was a more compatible political system with Epicureanism, the 
conservative nature of Epicurean political thought should lead to favouring the status 
quo as long as it does not directly threaten anything necessary for an Epicurean 
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lifestyle.  The Republic provided nothing necessary for an Epicurean that the tyranny 
could not.  I find that Momigliano’s and Sedley’s explanations of how Cassius might 
have justified the assassination lacking.  Momigliano’s ‘Heroic Epicureanism’ has 
very little evidence and its ideological aims are far removed from the modest political 
goals of Epicureanism.  Sedley’s proposed concept of ‘moral satisfaction’ as a 
secondary end in Epicureanism is appealing but also lacks evidence.  Griffin, on the 
other hand, is more illuminating; her proposal that Roman politicians’ philosophical 
interests were about providing a theoretical basis and framework of ideas rather than a 
complete guide on political action fits the relationship between Cassius’ Epicureanism 
and his actions particularly well.  Cassius’ letter to Cicero shows that, though the 
complete Epicurean lifestyle did not appeal to him at the time, he was still interested 
in Epicurean virtue.  It seems that Cassius appears to be an Epicurean, in touch with 
the virtues of Epicureanism, but capable of acting independently of them in this 
unique situation.  What my essay has shown is that Epicureanism was not sufficient to 
provide the justification for the assassination, given this his justification and 
motivation is likely comes from his staunch Republicanism. 
 
The consequences of Cassius’ decision were unfortunately quite the opposite of what 
he desired.  The death of Caesar led to further power struggles; Cassius and Brutus 
were forced to flee Rome, civil conflict was renewed by the 2nd triumvirate and mass 
proscriptions occurred, in which Cassius’ close friend Cicero was executed.129  Under 
such circumstances any kind of private, Epicurean lifestyle would have been 
impossible.  Cassius spent the rest of his life at war, gathering legions and fighting 
allies of the triumvirs; in 42 BC he returned to the West, meeting Brutus in Asia 
Minor.  The two friends led their armies to Philippi, in Macedon, where they were 
defeated by Antony and Octavian.  Knowing the battle was lost Cassius ordered one 
of his freedmen to kill him, despite suicide being against the beliefs of 
Epicureanism.130  This says a great deal about who Cassius was first and foremost, for 
in his bleakest moment he chose to follow the example of Cato the younger, 
committing suicide rather than learn to find tranquillity in the situation, as Epicurus 
                                                 
129 Plutarch, Cicero, 46-8 
130 Though Epicureans believe that death should not be feared, they also believe that life can always be 
enjoyed despite the situation; thus even if Cassius’ position after the battle of Philippi was rather bleak 
he still should have continued living, just as Epicurus continued to live after illness had made his life 
very painful. 
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might have done.131  In his final act Cassius chose to be a Republican first and an 
Epicurean second. 
 
What kept Cassius from acting as a true Epicurean were both his strong ideologically 
Republican, anti-tyrannical beliefs and the unique political problems, which plagued 
Rome throughout his life.  His personal, though un-Epicurean, hostility towards 
Caesar made it difficult and maybe impossible for him to simply step back from 
politics and lead a tranquil life; for someone with such strong Republican beliefs 
tranquillity and tyranny were irreconcilable.  This points to a shortcoming in 
Epicureanism, an inability to understand that certain character traits and deeply held 
beliefs cannot easily be let go in favour of a tranquil life, that the combination of 
strong ideals and unfortunate political events can lead a man to a point where 
tranquillity is impossible and the decision whether to act or not act is irrelevant.  What 
I conclude from my analysis of Cassius position and the important factors of 
Epicureanism is that the correct course for an Epicurean would be not to assassinate 
Caesar, but to act correctly, in this way, would be unlikely to help Cassius attain 
tranquillity because the betrayal of his Republican beliefs would ceaselessly disturb 
him.  This perhaps is an exception to Epicurus’ belief that all pains can be endured 
and tranquillity always attainable as such a deep psychological disturbance may be 












                                                 
131 Cato the younger committed suicide shortly after the battle of Thapsus.  Since Caesar had defeated 
all resistance to his tyranny Cato decided to end his life, reasoning that to live under a tyrant would be 
intolerable.  This action became a symbol of heroic defiance against tyranny and a precedent for those 
who believed in the Republic, which many would emulate. 
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Cicero Letters to his Friends 15.18 – Cicero to Cassius 46 BC 
 
My letter would have been longer had not I been asked for it at the very moment when 
a post to you was starting; longer too, had it contained some amount of persiflage; as 
for speaking seriously, we can hardly do so without risk. "Well then," you say, "we 
can have a laugh." No, I positively assure you, not very easily. And yet, that is the one 
and only thing we have to distract us from our troubles. "How about our philosophy 
then?" you will say. Well, yours is one of pleasure, but mine troubles me, because I 
am ashamed of being a slave. So I pretend to busy myself with other things, to prevent 




Cicero Letters to his Friends 15.17 – Cicero to Cassius 45 BC 
 
There is no news about Spain, but it is very eagerly awaited. There are rather 
depressing rumours, but they are unauthenticated. Our friend Pansa set out in military 
uniform on December the 30th, so that even the man in the street might grasp the fact 
which you had lately begun to question - that "the good must be chosen for its own 
sake." For because he relieved many of their afflictions, and because he proved his 
humanity amid all these disasters, he was escorted on his way by a marvellous display 
of kindly feeling on the part of honest men. As to your having stayed at Brundisium 
until now, I strongly approve of it and am glad of it; and upon my word, I think you 
will act wisely if you "shun vain pursuits." Certainly to me who love you, it will be a 
pleasure, and for the future when you send home a bundle of letters, remember me, 
and I'll bless you. For my own part I shall never allow anybody, if I know it, to go to 




Cicero Letters to his Friends 15.16 – Cicero to Cassius 45 BC 
 
For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my 
very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, 
who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres 
(for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives 
the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that 
Democritus, called images).  
 
But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up 
against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can 
see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, 
whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has 
taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost 
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heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that 
wing its way to my consciousness?  
 
But of this later on. I am only sounding you now to see in what spirit you take it. For 
if you are angry and annoyed, I shall have more to say, and shall insist upon your 
being reinstated in that school of philosophy, out of which you have been ousted "by 
violence and an armed force." In this formula the words "within this year" are not 
usually added; so even if it is now two or three years since, bewitched by the 
blandishments of Pleasure, you sent a notice of divorce to Virtue, I am free to act as I 
like. And yet to whom am I talking? To you, the most gallant gentleman in the world, 
who, ever since you set foot in the forum, have done nothing but what bears every 
mark of the most impressive distinction. Why, in that very school you have selected I 
apprehend there is more vitality than I should have supposed, if only because it has 
your approval. "How did the whole subject occur to you?" you will say. Because I had 
nothing else to write. About politics I can write nothing, for I do not care to write 




Cicero Letters to his Friends 15.19 – Cassius to Cicero 45 BC 
 
I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that 
gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking 
with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; 
and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a 
rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.  
 
I am glad that our friend Pansa was sped on his way by universal goodwill when he 
left the city in military uniform, and that not only on my own account, but also, most 
assuredly, on that of all our friends. For I hope that men generally will come to 
understand how much all the world hates cruelty, and how much it loves integrity and 
clemency, and that the blessings most eagerly sought and coveted by the bad 
ultimately find their way to the good. For it is hard to convince men that "the good is 
to be chosen for its own sake"; but that pleasure and tranquillity of mind is acquired 
by virtue, justice, and the good is both true and demonstrable. Why, Epicurus himself, 
from whom all the Catiuses and Amafiniuses in the world, incompetent translators of 
terms as they are, derive their origin, lays it down that "to live a life of pleasure is 
impossible without living a life of virtue and justice".  
 
Consequently Pansa, who follows pleasure, keeps his hold on virtue, and those also 
whom you call pleasure-lovers are lovers of what is good and lovers of justice, and 
cultivate and keep all the virtues. And so Sulla, whose judgment we ought to accept, 
when he saw that the philosophers were at sixes and sevens, did not investigate the 
nature of the good, but bought up all the goods there were; and I frankly confess that I 
bore his death without flinching. Caesar, however, will not let us feel his loss too 
long; for he has a lot of condemned men to restore to us in his stead, nor will he 
himself feel the lack of someone to bid at his auctions when once he has cast his eye 
on Sulla junior.  
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And now to return to politics; please write back and tell me what is being done in the 
two Spains. I am terribly full of anxiety, and I would sooner have the old and lenient 
master [Caesar], than make trial of a new and cruel one. You know what an idiot 
Gnaeus is; you know how he deems cruelty a virtue; you know how he thinks that we 
have always scoffed at him. I fear that in his boorish way he will be inclined to reply 
by wiping our turned-up noses with the sword. Write back as you love me, and tell me 
what is doing. Ah! how I should like to know whether you read all this with an 
anxious mind or a mind at ease! For I should know at the same time what it is my duty 
to do. Not to be too long-winded, I bid you farewell. Continue to love me as you do. If 




Plutarch  Brutus 37 
 
When the shape had disappeared, Brutus called his servants; but they declared that 
they had neither heard any words nor seen any apparition, and so he watched the night 
out. As soon as it was day, however, he sought out Cassius and told him of the 
apparition. Cassius, who belonged to the school of Epicurus, and was in the habit of 
taking issue on such topics with Brutus, said: "This is our doctrine, Brutus, that we do 
not really feel or see everything, but perception by the senses is a pliant and deceitful 
thing, and besides, the intelligence is very keen to change and transform the thing 
perceived into any and every shape from one which has no real existence. An 
impression on the senses is like wax, and the soul of man, in which the plastic 
material and the plastic power alike exist, can very easily shape and embellish it at 
pleasure. This is clear from the transformations which occur in dreams, where slight 
initial material is transformed by the imagination into all sorts of emotions and 
shapes. The imagination is by nature in perpetual motion, and this motion which it has 
is fancy, or thought. In thy case, too, the body is worn with hardships and this 
condition naturally excites and perverts the intelligence. As for genii, it is incredible 
either that they exist, or, if they do exist, that they have the appearance or the speech 
of men, or a power that extends to us. For my part, I could wish it were so, in order 
that not only our men-atarms, and horses, and ships, which are so numerous, but also 
the assistance of the gods might give us courage, conducting as we do the fairest and 




Plutarch Brutus 39 
 
However, it was thought that Cassius had a baleful sign during the lustration; for the 
lictor brought him his wreath turned upside down. And it is said that before this, also, 
in a procession at some festival, a golden victory belonging to Cassius, which was 
being borne along, fell to the ground, its bearer having slipped. And besides, many 
carrion birds hovered over the camp daily, and swarms of bees were seen clustering at 
a certain place inside the camp; this place the soothsayers shut off from the rest of the 
camp, in order to avert by their rites the superstitious fears which were gradually 
carrying even Cassius himself away from his Epicurean doctrines, and which had 





Plutarch Caesar 66 
 
Indeed, it is also said that Cassius, turning his eyes toward the statue of Pompey 
before the attack began, invoked it silently, although he was much addicted to the 
doctrines of Epicurus; but the crisis, as it would seem, when the dreadful attempt was 
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